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SAMENVATTING 
Dit onderzoeksrapport is het tweede in een reeks studies die de effecten van de 
zogenaamde economische groeilanden op ontwikkelingsamenwerkingsbeleid 
bestuderen. Terwijl het eerste een beschrijving gaf van de aanpak en de kenmerken 
van de ontwikkelingssamenwerking van Brazilië, India, China en Zuid-Afrika (BICS) 
inzake gezondheid en landbouw en voedselzekerheid (per land afzonderlijk), 
analyseert het tweede rapport de aanpak van de ‘niet-DAC ontwikkelingspartners’ in 
het algemeen, en illustreert dit met voorbeelden uit de hogergenoemde sectoren. Net 
als het eerste rapport is de informatie gebaseerd op een literatuurstudie. 
Geschiedenis: Brazilië, India en China hebben reeds een traditie als verschaffers van 
en partner in ontwikkelingssamenwerking die teruggaat tot de jaren vijftig en wortelt in 
internationale gebeurtenissen en processen, zoals de Bandung conferentie van 1955 
en de vorming van de Beweging van niet-gealigneerde landen in 1961, de publicatie 
van de acht principes van economische hulp en technische bijstand aan het buitenland 
van de PR China in 1964, de vorming van de G77 en de UNCTAD in 1964. Reeds in 
de jaren 1970 werd het concept Zuid-Zuidsamenwerking gelanceerd binnen de 
Verenigde Naties, verwijzend naar uitwisseling van expertise, goederen, technologie 
en personeel tussen actoren uit Latijns Amerika, Afrika en Azië. Na een periode van 
minder intense samenwerking, nam de Zuid-Zuidsamenwerking terug toe eind jaren 
negentig en vooral in de jaren 2000 (onder meer door het eind van de Koude Oorlog en 
de economische groei van de BICS, alsook het einde van het apartheidsregime in 
Zuid-Afrika). 
Budget: het is vooralsnog zeer moeilijk om een exacte inschatting te maken van de 
ontwikkelingssamenwerkingsbudgetten van de niet-DAC landen, en dan vooral voor 
specifieke sectoren zoals gezondheidszorg en landbouw. Dit wordt onder andere 
bemoeilijkt door het feit dat deze landen verschillende types van financiering 
aanwenden voor hun ontwikkelingssamenwerking en niet afzonderlijk over de officiële 
ontwikkelingshulp rapporteren. Voor de BICS zou het cijfer op een US$ 3 miljard liggen 
in 2010 oftewel tussen de 2% en 3% van de totale globale officiële ontwikkelingshulp 
vertegenwoordigen. 
Actoren: terwijl de institutionele overheidsstructuur van de PR China voor de opmaak 
van het beleid inzake ontwikkelingssamenwerking zeer gecentraliseerd is, hebben de 
meeste andere niet-DAC landen, en dan vooral Brazilië, India en Zuid-Afrika een 
veelheid van verschillende instellingen die een deel van het beleid bepalen. Bovendien 
worden er de laatste jaren nieuwe structuren opgericht om het beleid te beheren en te 
bepalen. Typerend is wel de grote rol van sectorspecifieke instellingen voor de 
ontwikkeling en uitvoering van het beleid. De belangrijkste beslissingen worden echter 
wel vaak op het hoogste niveau (i.e. presidentieel) genomen. De private sector neemt 
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een belangrijke plaats in in het beleid, maar er bestaat een gebrek aan onderzoek om 
hier sluitende uitspraken over te doen. De NGO sector is daarentegen vrijwel afwezig.  
Discours: de BICS en veel andere niet-DAC landen gebruiken in grote mate eenzelfde 
discours en schrijven zich niet expliciet in in de principes van de Verklaring van Parijs. 
Kernwaarden omvatten: gelijkwaardige partnerschappen, wederzijdse baten, 
solidariteit, geen voorwaarden, geen inmenging in binnenlandse zaken, vraaggestuurd 
en delen van eigen ervaringen. Afrika wordt alsmaar belangrijker als partnerregio voor 
Brazilië, India, China en Zuid-Afrika.  
Modaliteiten: de meeste samenwerking van de BICS verloopt bilateraal, maar vooral 
Brazilië exploreert in toenemende mate trilaterale samenwerking. Terwijl Brazilië vooral 
technische assistentie verschaft, maken China en India ook gebruik van 
kredietverschaffing en giften. Andere populaire modaliteiten omvatten projectsteun en 
beurzen, onderzoek en ontwikkeling en beleidsbeïnvloeding op internationaal niveau. 
Coördinatie: alhoewel er inspanningen worden gedaan tot meer samenwerking met de 
BICS, blijft coördinatie tussen traditionele donoren en de niet-DAC landen beperkt. 
Tussen de BICS zelf bestaan er wel enkele samenwerkingsinitiatieven. De 
belangrijkste staan bekend als BASIC, BRICS en IBSA. 
Uitdagingen: de niet-DAC ontwikkelingspartners en dan vooral Brazilië, India, China en 
Zuid-Afrika dagen de ‘traditionele’ ontwikkelingssamenwerking op tien manieren uit: 
1. ze verschaffen een extra bron van inkomsten aan de ontwikkelingslanden; 
2. ze maken gebruik van een mix van verschillende financiële instrumenten; 
3. ontwikkelingssamenwerking is een instrument van hun buitenlands beleid en 
dient vrij expliciet hun buitenlandse belangen; 
4. ze maken gebruik van een ander discours dan dat van de ‘traditionele donoren’; 
5. de voorwaarden die ze stellen aan hun ontwikkelingssamenwerking zijn zeer 
beperkt; 
6. ze investeren in meer harde sectoren en concentreren zich op economische 
groet als motor van ontwikkeling; 
7. de private sector neemt een centrale plaats in in hun 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking; 
8. expertise en kennis die de BICS hebben geleerd uit hun eigen geschiedenis om 
bepaalde ontwikkelingsvraagstukken aan te pakken, worden geacht beter aan 
te sluiten bij de context van ontwikkelingslanden. Specifieke aandacht verdient 
ICT en ‘frugal’ innovatieve oplossingen voor bestaande uitdagingen; 
9. in gezondheid hebben de BICS waardevolle expertise in de aanpak van 
HIV/AIDS, malaria en andere tropische en/of overdraagbare ziekten, de 
productie van medicijnen, openbare gezondheidszorg en institutionele 
versterking. In landbouw en voedselzekerheid beschikken ze nuttige expertise 
in het bestrijden van honger en armoede bij kinderen, het stimuleren van 
landbouwproductie, agro-business en kleinschalige landbouw; 
10. de zogenaamde opkomst van de BICS of de hernieuwde aandacht voor hun 
activiteiten doet vragen rijzen over coördinatie van activiteiten en geeft 
mogelijkheden tot nieuwe vormen van samenwerking en partnerschappen.  
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PREFACE 
 
This paper is the second in a series for the four year research (2012-2015) 
‘Challenging the status-quo? The impact of the emerging economies on the global 
governance of development cooperation’. The research is commissioned by the 
Flemish Government and framed within the Flemish Policy Research Centre for 
Foreign Affairs, International Entrepreneurship and Development Cooperation and 
carried out by the Belgian Research Institute for Work and Society (HIVA). It examines 
the characteristics (actors, motivation, objectives, means, methods) of Brazil, India, 
China and South Africa (BICS) and their effects on the organisation and methods of 
development cooperation in general and western donors in particular. Specific attention 
is given to development cooperation in health in Mozambique, and agriculture and food 
security in Malawi. While the first paper (see De Bruyn, 2013) presented four country 
studies and looked for the BICS’ involvement in health and agriculture and food 
security (AFS), this second research paper builds further on insights of the first paper 
and elaborates the main features of these countries’ general development cooperation 
approaches and illustrates these with examples from health and AFS. The third and 
fourth research papers focus on the involvement of the BICS in the agriculture and food 
security sector in Malawi and the health sector in Mozambique. The current and future 
results of the research are presented on the website of the Policy Research Centre.1 
                                                     
1
 See www.prc-if.eu. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ABC Agência Brasileira de Cooperação 
AFS agriculture and food security 
ARF African Renaissance Fund 
ARV antiretroviral 
AU African Union 
BASIC Brazil, South Africa, India, China 
BICS Brazil, India, China and South Africa 
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
CPLP Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa 
CSO civil society organisation 
DAC Development Assistance Committee 
DBSA Development Bank of Southern Africa 
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo 
DIRCO Department of International Relations and Cooperation 
EU European Union 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation 
FOCAC Forum on China - Africa Cooperation 
GAVI Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation 
GFATM Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
GHP Global health partnership 
IBSA India, Brazil, South Africa 
IDC Industrial Development Cooperation 
IIDCA India International Development Cooperation Agency 
NAM Non-Alignment Movement 
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
NGO non-governmental organisation 
ODA official development assistance 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OOF other official flows 
PRC People’s Republic of China 
SADPA South African Development Partnership Agency 
SSC South-South Cooperation 
TB Tuberculosis 
TCDC Technical Cooperation among Development Countries 
UN United Nations 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDP United National Development Programme 
WFP World Food programme 
WHO World Health Organisation 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In February 2012 a short viral internet movie was uploaded on the internet. A 
Caucasian woman, dressed in a yellow training suit, a blue stripe on her shoulders, 
clearly inspired by the heroine in Tarantino’s movie Kill Bill, enters an empty 
warehouse. Spaghetti western-style music accompanies her. Suddenly, a Chinese 
Kung Fu master jumps from one of the higher girders in the building and menaces her 
with his martial arts moves. Next, an Indian Kalaraipayattu fighter approaches her and 
threatens her with his sword. From a third side a Brazilian capoeira practitioner 
summersaults into the scene. The woman looks the three men surrounding her in the 
eyes, takes a meditative pose and splits into twelf versions of herself. Now the three 
men find themselves surrounded by a circle of identical women. They drop their 
weapons and aggressive attitudes and sit down following the women’s example. In the 
final scene, the women change into stars, while the rest of the screen turns blue, thus 
showing the flag of the European Union. The movie ends with the slogan ‘the more we 
are, the stronger we are’. 
 
A week after its launch this promotional video of the European Commission had 
already been withdrawn. It received thousands of complaints of viewers, depicting it as 
racist and imperialist (Waterfield, 2012). Although the core message was about the 
benefits of the EU enlargement, the video unintentionally demonstrated the fear of a 
western institution for emerging economies as Brazil, India and China. Although there 
is no evidence that this fear is widely shared, there is clearly a growing interest (and 
indeed sometimes concern) for the ‘new kids on the block’ in many western media and 
academic and policy circles including that of development cooperation. 
 
The ‘emergence’ of the ‘emerging donors’ 
 
Since the start as a policy field after the Second World War, western-based actors, 
including governmental agencies, multilateral institutions and NGOs dominated 
development cooperation. From around the turn of the century a whole new range of 
actors, including foundations, trade unions, farmers’ movements, cooperatives, 
companies and migrant organisations have complemented these players (Develtere, 
2012). But arguably the group that received most attention are those that became 
known as the emerging powers or donors - or as we prefer to call them the ‘non-DAC 
development partners or actors’2 (see further) - and more specifically Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa (the BRICS). 
 
Almost every publication that describes the history of the involvement of the BRICS 
and other middle and lower income countries as actors in development cooperation, 
refers to the 2003 paper of Goldman Sachs ‘Dreaming with the BRICs: the path to 
2050’ (see Wilson & Purushothaman, 2003). Although changes in the world economic 
order have always been a popular subject of interest to economists and policy makers, 
the paper of Goldman Sachs managed to catch the attention. At the turn of the century, 
the economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China equalled less than 15% of the 
combined economies of the G6 (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, the USA). The 
authors predicted that by 2025 this percentage would grow to about 50% and by 2040 
the former economies together would be larger than those of the G6. The paper 
                                                     
2
 DAC refers to the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). 
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determined to a large extent the terminology with which these countries were denoted: 
such as BRIC (and later on BRICS to include South Africa) and emerging economies.  
 
This paper set in motion a whole stream of new studies, essays and reports that looked 
into the role and evolution of these countries in the world economy, and also in other 
societal and policy sectors - from culture to health to development cooperation. Authors 
tried to identify whether the BRIC and other emerging economies were or would be 
playing a more important role in these sectors by looking for instance at budgets, 
modalities and institutions.  
 
Within the development cooperation sector, the debate gained momentum in 2006 
when Richard Manning, the Chair of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) gave a 
landmark speech in which he referred to emerging donors in the development arena 
(see Manning, 2006). These donors went for a long time unnoticed but would challenge 
the traditional donor community in the following decade. He singled out India and 
China, but others quickly extended their attention to Brazil, and other non-DAC donors 
(Kragelund, 2010).  
 
An immense body of literature emerged describing the characteristics of these 
(supposedly) new entrants and identifying their effects on the existing organisation and 
approaches and practices of development cooperation. Despite this attention, in 2010 
Kragelund concluded that there was no ‘reasonable accurate information about the 
scale, content, form, mode and sectoral distribution of non-traditional’s development 
assistance’ (2010: 18). In the last two years researchers and other authors have 
attempted to fill in the gaps in the knowledge, but there is still a long way to go. While 
broad overviews of the history, the institutional structure and some of the modalities of 
the bigger countries (and esp. Brazil, India and China) exist, information about the 
budget, sector-specific approaches and policies, the concrete situation on the field, and 
the smaller donors are still lagging behind. Consequently, the debate about the non-
DAC development partners is warped by perceptions, hearsay and discourse rather 
than objective evidence and on practice based information.  
 
Objectives and structure of the paper 
 
The four year study (2012-2015) ‘Challenging the status-quo? The impact of the 
emerging economies on the global governance of development co-operation’ attempts 
to address some of the gaps in the knowledge of the non-DAC development partners 
and features within the framework of the Policy Research Centre for the Development 
Cooperation of the Flemish Government.3  
 
It focuses on the development cooperation approaches of Brazil, India, China and 
South Africa (BICS)4 and more specifically on health in Mozambique and agriculture 
and food security in Malawi.  
To avoid confusion with the acronym BRICS or BRIC, we emphasise that the Russian 
Federation (the letter R in the acronym) is not included in this study and the four year 
                                                     
3
 See www.prc-if.eu. 
4
 For methodological reasons, the study will exclude Russia. A future paper will describe in detail the 
methodology of the entire study. As mentioned in the first research paper (De Bruyn, 2013: 15): ‘Important 
to note is that Brazil, India, China and South Africa are referred to as ‘BICS’. However, we stress that this 
does not at all imply that these countries act or should be seen as a homogeneous block or entity. The 
only reason why this abbreviation is used in this paper is for reasons of brevity. For the same reason, ‘the 
BICS’ is used, meaning ‘the countries belonging to group of countries of Brazil, India, China and South 
Africa’, but admittedly a construction that can be contested from a grammatical point of view.’ 
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research. This decisions is not only made for reasons of scale (else the research would 
yet another country), but also because Brazil, India, China and South Africa all share 
an important history of receivers of aid and share a number of similar development 
challenges (Kragelund, 2010). 
 
The first steps in the research aim to provide a background understanding of the 
general development cooperation approaches and the involvement in the 
aforementioned sectors. While the first paper presented four country studies and 
identified a number of general characteristics of the BICS’ development cooperation 
(see Table 1.1), this paper will take a broader look and analyse these general 
approaches and characteristics in more depth (the history, the financial resources, the 
actors, the discourse, the instruments and modalities, the coordination), with 
illustrations from health and AFS.  
 
Importantly, the analysis is entirely based on written material: policy documents and 
academic article and books and written media. Interviews, statistical analyses or other 
information sources are not used for this paper, but will inform next research steps in 
which the conclusions of the literature reviews will be scrutinised. Besides findings from 
the country studies, general literature on the BICS is used. The multitude of studies, 
articles, books, blogs and other publications have made it difficult, if not impossible, to 
grasp the entire academic and other output. We have therefore opted to base the 
analysis on a number of authors who have attempted to make a critical compilation of 
the existing views, such as Kragelund, Kharas and Brautigam. We specifically mention 
the in 2012 published book ‘From Recipients to Donors. Emerging Powers in the 
Changing Development Landscape’ of the at the University of Cambridge based 
scholar Emma Mawdsley. This book succeeds in giving a relatively concise and clear 
overview of the current state of the art regarding academic knowledge on emerging 
donors. Furthermore, most of the literature is on the governmental involvement of the 
BICS in development cooperation. The private sector and civil society initiatives are 
under-researched. Vaes and Huyse (2013) give an overview of civil society and South-
South cooperation, with a specific focus on the BICS, while forthcoming researches of 
HIVA and the Policy Research Centre will focus on the private sector and development 
cooperation in the BICS.5  
 
Terminology: development cooperation and non-DAC development actors 
 
As mentioned in the first research paper, the study focuses on development 
approaches understood as approaches that ‘are aimed at promoting political, social, 
economic or technical cooperation with Latin American, African or Asian countries in 
order to achieve development. What kind of development is dependent on the definition 
given by the actors involved. Importantly, the focus of the paper is thus not only 
development assistance or aid, as understood as Official Development Aid (ODA), but 
goes beyond this and entails also other kinds of cooperation and assistance’ (De 
Bruyn, 2013: 14-15, and see §1.3 in this paper). 
 
Furthermore, instead of emerging economies or donors, non-DAC development 
partners or actors is used in this paper. First, ‘Emerging economies or donors’ give the 
incorrect impression that countries such as the BICS only recently act as assisting, 
donating or cooperating actors in development cooperation (see §1.1). Second, the use 
of donors is rejected by countries such as Brazil, India and China since they reject the 
                                                     
5
 See www.prc-if.eu. 
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supposedly unequal donor-recipient relationship that this entails, and hence do not 
consider themselves as donors (see §1.5). 
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1. DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION OF BRAZIL, INDIA, CHINA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
1.1 The longtime tradition of Brazil, India, China and South Africa in 
development cooperation 
 
1.1.1 The origins: advocates of South-South cooperation  
 
The terminology used in the literature about the BICS is deceiving. Many ‘emerging’ or 
‘new donors’ have had a history as donors or assisting partners in development or 
international cooperation (King, 2010; Molenaar, 2011; Chin & Qadir, 2012). Already 
from the 1950s, Brazil, China and India set up cooperation projects with other 
developing countries. Agriculture and health featured among the main assistance 
sectors. China started sending out medical and agricultural teams in the 1960s, while 
India gave equipment and Brazil provided technical assistance in agriculture for some 
decades. And all three countries have been offering scholarships and short training 
courses for about 40 years (Mawdsley, 2012; Chaturvedi et al., 2012).  
 
On the international level a series of events and processes are considered to be the 
predecessors of the current development cooperation policies of the ‘not so new 
donors’, as Mawdsley (2012) explains. The most important one - especially for India - is 
arguably the Bandung conference of 1955 and the subsequent creation of the Non-
Alignment Movement (NAM) in 1961. While the Soviets and the West were vying for 
world hegemony and tried to incorporate African, Latin American and Asian countries in 
their sphere of influence, a number of countries refused to align themselves with one of 
them and tried to offer an alternative to these two blocks. India, Egypt, Yugoslavia and 
Indonesia were among the initiators of the NAM. The experiences and conclusions of 
the NAM are still evident in the current discourses of many of the ‘re-emerging donors’. 
In the same period, in 1964, the Chinese government published its eight principles of 
economic aid and technical assistance to foreign countries. 
 
Two other events stand out: the formation of the G77 - resulting from the 1962 
conference in Cairo on the ‘Problems of Economic Development; and the creation of 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, to 
promote economic cooperation and integration between developing countries. These 
gave rise to the Declaration of the New International Economic Order, in which a new 
political and economic framework was proposed based on equal relations between 
countries. Especially important was the 1978 UNCTAD Buenos Aires Plan of Action for 
Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries. The 
Plan emphasised the role developing countries could play in looking for own 
development solutions. This plan marked an important stimulus for Brazil’s cooperation 
initiatives. The UN General Assembly formalised its support for cooperation among 
developing countries, by setting up the Unit for South-South cooperation (SSC). 
Although the concept initially referred to trade among developing countries, it has 
become to imply ‘the exchange of resources, personnel, technology and knowledge 
between ‘developing’ countries - a loose definition that can cover almost any form of 
interaction from South-South foreign direct investment by Asian, African and South-
American multinational firms, to diplomatic meetings and agreements, to the provision 
of technical experts’ (Mawdsley, 2012: 63). As such SSC is a much broader concept 
than foreign aid. 
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1.1.2 The re-emergence or re-discovery of development cooperation actors 
 
From the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s, the cooperation between developing 
countries started to take another form. Global political and economic changes showed 
that the common principles or ground was often not that strong. Especially the oil crisis 
in the 1970s, the debt crisis in the 1980s and the end of the Cold War influenced 
dramatically the configuration, and even in a stand-still in commitment to South-South 
cooperation. Although bilateral commitments of China, India or Brazil to specific 
countries, in particular those geographically nearby, were carried on in agricultural, 
health and other sectors - China even broadened its cooperation to other countries 
following the diplomatic competition with Taiwan - Brazil, India and China main interest 
returned to domestic issues. Hence, development cooperation was left to the Northern 
countries (Mawdsley, 2012; Kragelund, 2010).  
 
This might explain why Brazil, India and China were not included in the debate on 
development cooperation earlier. From the end of the 1990s and especially the 
beginning of the new millennium the Southern countries started to re-emerge on the 
development cooperation field, not as recipients but also as donors or partners. In 
addition South Africa joined the group. Until then, South Africa was the odd one out - 
although the apartheid government also assisted other African countries, its current 
policies only took form after the transition to democracy in 1994 (Sidiropoulos, 2012). 
 
The re-emergence of Brazil, India and China could be seen in their rising share in the 
total development aid, the increase of regional meetings with other developing 
countries, the growth of trade and investment, and the surge of diplomatic visits of 
government representatives to other - mainly African - countries. Mawdsley (2012) 
proposes an additional interesting hypothesis, notably that part of these countries were 
merely invisible to the western academicians and donors. She gives the example of the 
Cuban aid to Haiti after the major earthquake in 2010. Although Cuba was the first to 
offer medical assistance to Haiti, it was completely ignored by western media, because 
the Cubans were not ‘recognised’ as aid workers. They did not fit the framework of the 
known western NGOs and aid agencies. Also most of the assistance-providing 
countries from Africa, Asia or Latin America, have had a history of receivers of aid - 
and thus it would be counterlogic to regard them as donors. And lastly, the ‘fear’ of the 
western countries for the ‘emerging economies’ as illustrated by the example in the 
introduction of this paper, might be an implicit motivating factor for the increased 
attention. 
 
1.2 The characteristics of development cooperation of Brazil, India, China and 
South Africa: summary 
 
In the first research paper (see De Bruyn, 2013) I listed the main features of the 
general development cooperation approaches of Brazil, China, India and South Africa. 
Table 1.1 reproduces this summary. In the remainder of this paper, each of these 
issues will be dealt with in more detail in order to identify the similarities or difference 
between the BICS. 
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Table 1.1 Main features of the development cooperation of Brazil, India, 
China and South Africa 
 Brazil India China South Africa 
Aid (in US$)
6
 Estimates range from 
362 million (2009) to 
1.2 billion (2010) 
Estimates range 
from 639 million 
(2009) to 1.48 billion 
(2007) 
Estimates range 
from 2 billion (2010) 
to 3.1 billion (2008) 
Lot of confusion, 
estimates around 
US$ 100 million 
     
Governmental 
institutional 
structure 
(leading actor) 
Fragmented and 
implementation carried out 
by sector specific actors  
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Agência Brasileira do 
Cooperação) 
Very fragmented and 
in process of change 
(Ministry of External 
Affairs) 
Highly centralised 
structure, and 
implementation 
decentralised 
(Department of 
Foreign Aid of the 
Ministry of 
Commerce) 
In process of 
change 
(DIRCO and in the 
future SADPA) 
     
Principles Solidarity, mutual benefit, 
demand driven, non-
conditionality, non-
interference, recognition of 
local expertise 
Solidarity, mutual 
benefit 
Equality, mutual 
benefit, respect for 
sovereignty, non-
condionality, 
emphasis on 
building self- 
reliance, the same 
standard of living 
for experts 
dispatched by 
China and local 
experts 
Solidarity, mutual 
benefit, ‘ubuntu’ 
     
Main financial 
instruments 
Concessional loans and 
grants 
Export credits, con-
cessional loans and 
grants. Integration of 
commercial finance 
and aid 
Grants, credit lines, 
interest free loans 
and concessional 
loans, but Other 
Official flow more 
important than 
ODA. Integration of 
commercial finance 
and aid 
Grants and loans 
     
Main 
modalities 
Technical assistance, 
scholarships, humanitarian 
assistance, global 
advocacy 
Scholarships, 
technical assistance, 
humanitarian 
assistance 
‘Complete projects’, 
technical 
assistance, 
equipment, capacity 
building, emergency 
aid, volunteer pro-
grams 
Projects, technical 
cooperation, 
humanitarian 
assistance 
     
Main types of 
cooperation 
Bilateral, multilateral and 
trilateral 
Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral, 
multilateral trilateral 
     
Country focus Latin America and African 
countries (Lusophone in 
particular) 
Neighbouring 
countries and Africa 
Global, but 
increasingly Africa 
Africa 
     
Main sectors Health, education, 
agriculture, social security  
Agriculture, 
infrastructure, 
economic sectors 
and ICT 
Infrastructure, 
productive sectors, 
agriculture, energy, 
health and 
agriculture 
Post-conflict 
resolution, peace-
building, regional 
integration 
Source De Bruyn, 2013: 45 
 
 
 
                                                     
6
 In brackets the year to which estimate refers to. 
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1.3 Separating fact from fiction: looking for budgets  
 
1.3.1 Identifying development aid budgets 
 
One of the main challenges of academicians in the last years was the identification of 
committed and disbursed aid and development cooperation budgets of the non-DAC 
countries. Available data should be treated with caution because limited reporting, 
administrative burdens or reluctance to disclose information, different reporting 
systems, inadequate resources of donor agencies, and differing definitions of 
development aid and assistance render the calculation of exact figures very difficult 
(Mawdsley, 2012).  
 
The organisational set-up of development cooperation, and specifically that within the 
sectors of health and AFS involves a multitude of different actors. While funds are 
provided by governments, private foundations and individuals and the business sector, 
the managing and the ultimate spending of the cooperation incorporates a more 
complex set of actors. Concentrating on the funders alone, the most reliable source of 
information is the OECD-DAC database. Besides the 24 DAC members, also 21 non-
DAC members report to the OECD-DAC. Unfortunately for our analysis, Brazil, India, 
China nor South Africa are among them, but other calculations have been made which 
incorporate information about them. Nevertheless, the estimates differ to a certain 
extent.  
 
Kharas (2012) states that of the roughly US$ 200 billion ODA in 2008, US$ 87 billion 
came from bilateral aid from DAC donors, US$ 34 billion from multilateral donors, and 
US$ 60-70 billion from private philanthropists. He mentions a figure of US$ 15 billion 
from non-DAC official donors (which thus not include the BICS). Zimmerman and Smith 
(2011) calculated that in total these non-DAC countries together plus the BRIC (so this 
time South Africa is not included) channelled almost US$ 11 billion to development aid, 
representing about 8% of the global total in 2009/2010. By 2010, this might have 
augmented to US$ 14 billion, or 10-12% of the global total, according to calculations of 
Park (2011, see also Mawdsley, 2012). Bilal (2012) mentions a share of about 10% in 
2009 for 25 countries engaged in ‘South-South cooperation’, incl. the BICS.  
 
Based on most information it seems that the share of the BICS in the total official 
development aid, would be between 2% (according to Zimmerman and Smith 2011) 
and 3% (according to Bilal, 2012). With an aggregate total of about US$ 3 billion for the 
BICS in 2010, the figures of the Global Humanitarian Assistance website7  confirm 
these estimations. According to this website, the total given aid (ODA) of the individual 
countries in would be: Brazil: US$ 362 million (2009), India: US$ 639 million (2010), 
China: US$ 2 billion (2010), South Africa: US$ 98 million (2010). In the first research 
report, I quoted also the other existing figures for each of these countries (see De 
Bruyn, 2013). 
 
From the available information it can be concluded that cooperation from non-DAC 
development partners (in this case governments) remains relatively small, but as 
Kharas (2012) points out, this figures may give only a partial view on the real 
development cooperation disbursements.  
                                                     
7
 www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org. 
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1.3.2 Going beyond Official Development Aid 
 
One of the main issues of confusion in the discussion about non-DAC development 
partners in development cooperation arises from the mingling of foreign aid with other 
kinds of assistance and cooperation. This can be illustrated by looking at the different 
types of development finance. Development finance encompasses more than solely 
ODA8 (see Figure 1.1). The other funding offered by governments - known as Other 
Official Flows (OOF) - comprises mainly of lending by export credit agencies to 
stimulate export, military aid, and other OOF which do not adhere to the ODA 
conditions. Next, the private flows entail at least five different funding mechanisms, as 
Figure 1.1 shows, but only the private grants (i.e. private funding from NGOs, 
foundations and global funds) are considered as foreign aid (Brautigam, 2011).  
 
Figure 1.1 Structure of global development finance 
 
Source Brautigam, 2011: 204 
 
A major difference with DAC-donors is that aid is often tied in the development 
cooperation policies of the non-DAC development partners. Thus the boundaries 
between aid and commercial interests are blurred. In addition, these partners mix or 
blend trade, investment and cooperation efforts. Consequently it is difficult, and often 
impossible, to neatly fit the finance flow into the DAC-scheme. Some flows are a 
mixture of ODA and OOF with private flows, but are not disaggregated as such (see 
further). For Brazil, India, China and South Africa the problem is exacerbated by the 
limited reporting of their development finance to the DAC (Mawdsley, 2012). Thus, 
when reading and analysing published figures about the BICS’ development aid it must 
be kept in mind that these might incorporate other official financial or/and private flows.  
 
 
                                                     
8
 Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been defined by the DAC Committee in 1972 as follows ‘to 
countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions 
which are (i) provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive 
agencies; and (ii) each transaction of which (a) is administered with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and (b) is concessional in 
character and conveys a grant element of at least 25% (calculated at a rate of discount of 10%)’ (OECD, 
2009: 1). 
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1.3.3 What about the budgets for cooperation in agriculture and food security and 
health 
 
Sector specific figures are even more difficult to come by. Actually for none of the BICS 
it was possible to determine exactly the amount of cooperation per sector.9 Either there 
were only aggregate figures available for the total cooperation, or specific channels 
(such as lines of credit), or disbursement of commitments were only disclosed for a 
certain type of aid.  
 
Over time the importance of the different organisations and actors in financial terms 
evolved significantly. The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) has 
calculated the evolution of official development assistance in health between 1990 and 
2011. Figure 1.2 illustrates the conclusions and presents the changing landscape of aid 
donors in health. 10  Traditional bilateral donors still remain important, as do the 
multilateral agencies with in health the WHO, UNICEF and UNAIDS, the World Bank 
and the European Commission (equivalent of the biggest UN donor in AFS, would be 
IFAD, Coppard, 2010). An important new actor, especially in the health sector, includes 
the global health partnerships (GHPs), such as the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, TB 
and Malaria (Global Fund), and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation 
(GAVI). Importantly, the BICS do not yet feature in this overview.  
 
Figure 1.2 The evolution of the donor landscape in development assistance in 
health (1990-2011) 
 
Source Website of ‘a view from the cave’11 based on Leach Kemon et al., 
2011 
 
To have an idea of the investment in health and AFS assistance, the budget of the 
BICS for overall ODA in AFS and health can be compared with the total estimated 
assistance from the BICS. AFS and health have always been among the main focal 
sectors of the traditional development cooperation. In the last two decades the 
importance of development cooperation in health, incl. reproductive health and 
population, from DAC members has increased steadily from about US$ 3.0 billion in 
1991 to more than US$ 20.0 billion in 2011, while that for agriculture and food security 
cooperation and aid has picked up after a period of decrease at the end of the last 
                                                     
9
 The AidData website might address this question in the future (see www.aiddata.org). In the following 
research reports (the country/sector studies on Malawi and Mozambique) the information of this data 
source will be used. 
10
For complete analysis see Leach Kemon et al. 2011 and 
http://www.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/tools/data-visualisation/development-assistance-health-
channel-assistance-global-1990-2011-interacti#/overview/stories. 
11
 Http://www.aviewfromthecave.com/2012/08/the-changing-landscape-of-development.html. 
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century to about respectively US$ 10.7 billion and US$ 1.6 billion in 2011 (see 
Figure 1.3). In relative terms, health, incl. population and reproductive health, has 
become the most important sector after governance for DAC countries. On the other 
hand AFS has lost some of its importance in total ODA spending in the last twenty 
years. Health and AFS are nowadays each responsible for about 6 to 7% of total ODA. 
Only education, governance, humanitarian aid and transport and storage receive more 
funding than AFS.  
 
Figure 1.3 Evolution of the ODA spent per sector in terms of ODA (in 1,000 
million US$) 
 
Source OECD Stats12 
 
Figure 1.4 Evolution of the relative importance per sector in terms of ODA (on 
total ODA, in %)  
 
Source OECD Stats13 
 
The overall cooperation budget of the BICS in 2010 (i.e. about US$ 3 billion) 
represented about 10% of the total ODA budget for health and AFS of the OECD-DAC 
                                                     
12
 Http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=CRS1#. 
13
 Http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=CRS1#. 
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countries (i.e. about 31 billion).The real amount dedicated to AFS and health from the 
BICS will certainly be much smaller.  
 
The available policy documents and studies show that first and foremost, non-DAC 
countries invest in ‘hard’ sectors, such as infrastructure, energy and agriculture, aimed 
at economic growth instead of poverty reduction. Reasons behind this choice include 
according to Mawdsley (2012) the direct benefits for donor and recipient (in the sense 
that donor’s countries firms can be contracted) and the belief in the paradigm of 
economic growth.  
 
This does not mean that the social sectors are neglected. Health and education are foci 
of several non-DAC countries, and especially Brazil. For instance, agriculture took up 
26% of Brazil’s technical cooperation’s budget in Africa between 2003 and 2010, health 
about 22% (Cabral & Shankland, 2012). South Africa singled out peace building and 
conflict resolution (De Bruyn, 2013). 
 
Nevertheless, the concentration on enhancing economic growth has raised the fear of 
some commentators that this would be at the expense of poverty alleviation and 
combating inequality, and eventually would mark a return to the modernisation theories 
of the 1960s and 1980s. The underlying hypothesis is that traditional donors as well as 
recipient countries would follow the strategy of the non-DAC countries (Mawdsley, 
2012). The sectoral differences between DAC- and non-DAC countries can also be 
interpreted in a more positive manner. In the last two decades the DAC-countries have 
gradually reduced their assistance in infrastructure and productive sectors. The latter 
countries fill up this gap. Instead of substituting the existing DAC-development 
cooperation, they complement it (Kragelund, 2010 & Dreher et al., 2011). 
 
Although probably rather modest in volume, the BICS provides additional means and 
resources to deal with development challenges (Kragelund, 2010 & Bilal, 2012). Not 
only international organisations gain extra funds, but also partner countries (or the 
recipients of assistance). It also implies that the latter become less dependent on the 
traditional development aid, which makes it easier for them to carve out their own 
development path. Although, it might mean that certain economic and political reforms 
will not take place. All in all, the available funds still seem to be too low to bring about 
these results on a great scale. 
 
1.4 The main actors - a field in evolution 
 
1.4.1 Central position of the government  
 
The organisation of the management and implementation of governmental 
development cooperation within the BICS and other non-DAC countries is often said to 
be complex and not well documented (Mawdsley, 2012). Although there are still 
important questions about the institutions involved, and their decision making power, it 
is possible to identify some important characteristics, (1) relating to the decision making 
level; (2) the number of actors involved; (3) the task of the main development agencies; 
(4) the re-organisation and (5) the strength of the institutional structures. 
 
First, policy making in development cooperation happens at the highest governmental 
levels. For the BICS, development cooperation is in first instance an instrument of their 
foreign policy, and thus it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, often in conjunction with the 
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president or the chairman that lays out the priorities of the development cooperation 
policy. This is best illustrated by the case of Brazil, where former President Lula Da 
Silva was instrumental in promoting the country’s importance as an actor in 
development cooperation (Vidigal, 2010). At first sight, other stakeholders and policy 
actors are hardly involved in the decision making process (Davies, 2010). However, as 
the second feature demonstrates, sector specific actors (and especially ministries) take 
up an important role.  
 
A second typical feature of many of the non-DAC countries, is the multitude of 
domestic governmental agencies and departments engaging in the design and the 
implementation of the development cooperation activities. Responsibilities for the 
different aspects of development cooperation are thus scattered among various 
entities. For instance, in Brazil more than 65 institutions could be involved in 
development cooperation (GHSI, 2012). An exception is China: its policy making and 
implementation is very centralised, although also here a variety of governmental levels 
are engaged in the execution of development cooperation. Sector specific ministries 
and agencies play a much greater role in development (and especially technical) 
cooperation than in the DAC-countries (Rowlands, 2012). Often they have their own 
international offices or research centres, which carry out cooperation projects with 
institutions in partner countries. These institutions are experts in their field and are 
considered to be the most appropriate actors to share their solutions for addressing 
domestic development problems with other countries. The country that illustrates this 
best is Brazil. For health cooperation, the Ministry of Health develops the main policies 
while Fiocruz, a public health institution, implements the programmes and projects 
((Russo et al., 2013). Similarly for agriculture (and specifically agribusiness), the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply, and the specialised institution Embrapa 
are the main actors. Nevertheless, other ministries and institutions play a role as well 
and sometimes set up competing or parallel programmes. For instance, the Ministry of 
Social Development and the Ministry of Agrarian Development are involved in food 
security and small scale farming (Cabral & Shankland, 2012).  
 
Third, the department responsible for development cooperation in general acts 
primarily as a liaison office (see De Bruyn, 2013). It directs the demands of partner 
countries to the appropriate department or ministry. This also implies that programs 
and projects are not necessarily executed by general development specialists, but by 
technical personnel. A risk - which needs to be further investigated - could be that 
these experts lack country and cultural specific knowledge and awareness. 
 
Fourth, although a number of non-DAC countries, and especially India, China and 
Brazil have a long history in development cooperation, most countries are still in the 
process of re-organising their institutional structure for development cooperation. Many 
non-DAC countries are making efforts to coordinate and concentrate their activities by 
setting up central development cooperation agencies. In most cases however, this is 
still in the first phase. South Africa is setting up its South African Development 
Partnership Agency (SADPA) that should coordinate its incoming and outgoing 
assistance and in 2012 India has established its Development Assistance Partnership 
within the Ministry External Affairs. Brazil’s Agency for Cooperation (ABC) exists 
already for several decades, but it is mainly responsible for coordinating only a small 
part of the country’s outgoing assistance, i.e. technical assistance (De Bruyn, 2013).  
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Consequently, most non-DAC countries (China is a notable exception) possess a 
rather weak institutional structure (Mawdsley, 2012). This is reflected in limited trained 
personnel, insufficient power of development cooperation agencies in comparison to 
other governmental departments, and difficulties to set up development cooperation 
strategies, and policies. Mawdsley (2012) points out that the increased attention and 
investments in development cooperation are rendered difficult by incapacities of the 
domestic bureaucracies to keep up with this new evolution. The same may be valid for 
embassies that play an important role in carrying out the development cooperation 
activities, but they often lack adequate resources and know-how to carry out this task.  
Lastly, most information deals with central government agencies. Regional 
governmental levels (states or provinces) might have their own developmental policies 
in Brazil, India or China. However there is a lack of data on this issue.  
 
1.4.2 The important but under-researched role of the private sector 
 
Characteristic for the BICS countries is the importance given to the private sector. All 
four countries engage or promote the private sector in their development cooperation 
(Cabral & Shankland, 2013; Gu, 2009; Regnier, 2013; Van Dijk, 2009). 
 
The country studies in De Bruyn (2013) showed that in health, the BICS’ private sector 
includes the pharmaceutical industry and private hospitals, while in agriculture, trading 
and production companies play a central role. In general though, infrastructure 
companies and companies active in the extractive industry are among the most 
influential actors in Africa. However, what role the BICS’ private sector plays, is still 
under-researched. Consequently, an analysis of the development cooperation of the 
BICS that only takes into account development aid or development cooperation as 
understood and defined by the DAC, runs the risk of omitting important defining 
features and actors. The role of the private sector in development cooperation, 
including the BICS, will also be the object of another study in 2014 of the Policy 
Research Centre for the Development Cooperation of the Flemish Government.14 
 
1.4.3 Absence of civil society 
 
As with private sector actors, little is known about civil society actors of the non-DAC 
countries (see also Vaes & Huys, 2013). On the one hand, certain non-DAC countries 
with a strong civil society, such as Brazil and South Africa would be expected to follow 
the same path (see for instance Campolina, 2012; Leys 2008). On the other hand, 
other non-DAC countries seem to disregard CSOs, as well in their own countries as in 
the partner countries. This might be due to their own historical relations and views on 
CSOs - as is the case with China. In other cases, especially where development 
cooperation is seen as an instrument for its own foreign policy, CSOs are regarded as 
hindrances.  
 
According to Peter Konijn of Knowing Emerging Powers in Africa15 CSOs of non-DAC 
countries themselves do not attempt actively to enlarge their scope to development 
cooperation. It applies for development projects abroad, as well as for lobby and 
advocacy and critical appraisal of their own government’s development cooperation 
policies. This is not only due to limited interest or resources, but also might reflect an 
implicit entente between domestic state and non-state actors of not jeopardising the 
                                                     
14
 See www.prc-if.eu. 
15
 Personal communication June 2013. 
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countries gradually growing importance in the international arena. The almost complete 
absence of the civil society sector can be witnessed in the health and agricultural 
sectors. An important caveat however, is that within international NGOs and 
international institutions nationals of the BICS might be active.  
 
1.5 The discourse of Brazil, India, China and South Africa 
 
1.5.1 Shared (ethical) principles 
 
All of the BICS and many other non-DAC countries have to a certain extent common 
values and principles on which they founded their development cooperation. The eight 
principles of Chinese foreign aid, the conclusions of the 1955 Bandung conference 
which gave rise to the Non-Alignment Movement and the 1978 UNCTAD Buenos Aires 
Action Plan are considered as the main inspirations, as the country studies in the first 
research report show (see De Bruyn, 2013) show.  
 
Important to note is that these principles guide the discourse of the BICS, but not 
necessarily the practice. Admittedly, this is no different for the DAC-countries. Still, 
rethorics can serve as legitimising devices, as Strauss (2009, cited in Mawdsley, 2012) 
points out. In their discourse, the BICS reject the terminology and the approaches of 
the western DAC donors. Many of the non-DAC countries avoid the terms ‘donors’ and 
‘development aid’, since they do not consider themselves as such. ‘Donor - recipient’ 
relations and ‘aid’ mirror the ‘traditional development practices and ideologies of the 
western countries’, which are imbedded in unequal power relations between countries. 
Instead, the terms international, development or South-South cooperation and 
development partners are preferred. Sometimes this is a false opposition. For instance, 
also in the DAC-terminology aid is increasingly replaced with international or 
development cooperation, and recipients with partners. Yet the opposition to DAC-
donor semantics is important to understand the discourses as well as the practices of 
BICS’ development cooperation (Mawdsley, 2012).  
 
The core principles of the BICS can be summarised as followed: equal partnerships, 
mutual benefits, solidarity, no conditions, no-interference, demand driven and sharing 
of own experiences. The Brazilian development cooperation frame their policies in 
‘horizontal cooperation’, the South African development cooperation focused on the 
‘African Renaissance’, the Indians refer in their speeches to common colonial histories 
and the solidarity movement of Gandhi and the Chinese make references to their long-
standing eight principles. 
 
Table 1.2 summarises and contrasts the claims imbedded in the discourses of DAC-
donors and non-DAC development partners. This is based on work of Mawdsley 
(2012: 152, supplemented with own comments). Important to keep in mind is that these 
claims should be read as the common understanding of what development cooperation 
means in the different contexts. In western countries for instance there has been an 
important evolution in thinking about development cooperation, away from charity or 
superior-inferior relationships, but the supposedly dominant implicit paradigm (in other 
words, what ‘the people’ think of, when they think of development cooperation) is still 
as described in the table. 
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Table 1.2 The symbolic claims of western donors and southern development 
partners 
Western donors Southern development partners 
Charity Opportunities 
  
Moral obligation to the unfortunate Solidarity with other developing countries 
  
Expertise based on superior knowledge, 
institution, science and technology 
Expertise based on direct experience of 
pursuing development in poor-country 
circumstances 
  
The virtue of suspended obligation, a 
lack of reciprocity 
The virtue of moral benefit, and 
recognition of reciprocity and mutual 
benefit* 
  
Superior moral values translated in 
conditions and interference* 
Relativistic approach, translated in no-
conditions or interference in other 
countries* 
Source Mawdsley: 152, supplemented with own comments (marked with *) 
 
In international politics, discourse often tends to mask underlying motivations and a 
different reality. This has also been said about the principles of the non-DAC countries. 
As Mawdsley (2012: 158) states: ‘Whereas the West deploys a symbolic regime of 
charity and benevolence to obscure this truism, the Southern donors invoke the 
rethoric of solidarity, mutual benefit and shared identities’. To put it very blunt: 
ultimately, national interests will be one - if not the - motivating driver of any 
development policy. In each of the country studies in the first research report (see De 
Bruyn, 2013) it was apparent that the development cooperation policy was an implicit 
or sometimes even explicit instrument of the country’s foreign policies. So besides soli-
darity objectives, political and economic motivations play and important role. In this 
sense, the BICS are by no means different than the DAC donors.  
 
Political objectives include the recognition of the PR China as the sole representative of 
China, gaining a seat in the UN Security Council for Brazil and India, regional political 
competition between China and India. Economically, the four counties are looking for 
new trade partners and export possibilities. Cooperation is also typically tied: a share of 
the grants or concessional loan should be spent on re-investing in domestic donor firms 
(by buying products or engaging technical experts). Chandy and Kharas (2011) argue 
that tied aid from non-DAC donors could be less problematic for recipient countries 
than tied aid by DAC-donor because in comparison their provided goods and services 
are cheaper and more adapted to local contexts. 
 
Also health and agriculture play a role in attaining these political and economic ends. 
Cooperation in these sectors can foster goodwill and stronger ties between countries, it 
can open up opportunities for trade as well as possibilities for companies to export 
products or to produce in the partner country.  
 
1.5.2 ... which are reflected in the choice of partner countries 
 
The strategic political and economic motivations are also apparent in the choice of the 
partner countries of the BICS (as is the case for the DAC-donors).  
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A first group of partner countries are the neighbouring countries. Kondoh et al. (2010) 
make the important remark that many of the non-DAC countries (and especially China 
and India), border on poor and conflict-ridden or politically unstable countries - which is 
a marked difference with DAC-countries. A second group comprises of countries 
located in the same region as the donor, for instance Latin America for Brazil, South 
and South-East Asia for India, East and South-East Asia for China. South Africa’s 
development cooperation is entirely geared towards Africa and especially Southern 
Africa. Gaining and upholding regional power is one of the main motivations. A third 
group are countries with which non-DAC donors have some kind of historical or cultural 
ties. Brazil and its ties with lusophone countries is a case example, while India’s 
diaspora in Africa is an important decisive factor for its geographical engagement. 
Fourth, to gain global political power and opening up markets in a globalised world, 
India, China and increasingly Brazil, concentrate on a large number of partner 
countries all over the world. Furthermore and often forgotten, is that some non-DAC 
countries also assist Northern countries following natural disasters. Examples include 
India to Japan after the 2011 tsunami (Mawdsley, 2012).  
 
Lastly, (Sub-Saharan) Africa stands out as recipient or partner region for a growing 
number of non-DAC countries, and especially the BICS. In fact, most of the literature 
on the development cooperation of the BICS focuses on this continent, and in particular 
on the risk that the search for natural resources might spark a new scramble for Africa. 
Kragelund (2010) argues that the perception of Africa differs significantly between DAC 
and non-DAC donors. The latter regard African countries as business partners and 
sources of natural resources, and their development cooperation is taking this (overtly) 
into account. The former on the other hand see Africa as a ‘lost continent’.  
 
1.5.3 The BICS and the Paris principles 
 
One of the main concerns of the DAC-based development actors, is that the new 
development partners will endanger the implementation of the so-called aid 
effectiveness paradigm. Subsequent negotiation rounds in in Rome (2003), Paris 
(2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011) have resulted in a set of guiding principles, 
formulated in the Paris Declaration (ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for 
results and mutual accountability) and Accra Agenda for Action (predictability, use of 
partner country systems, conditionality based on partner country’s own objectives, 
untying aid). These principles have been developed and agreed in first instance by 
members of the DAC-community (thus mainly governmental agencies). Only during the 
last High Level Meeting in Busan, other actors, including the BICS, had a significant 
say (Mawdsley, 2012). Several authors have compared DAC and non-DAC 
approaches to the Paris principles, see for instance Table 1.3. In short, the DAC-
countries, as Paulo and Reisen (2010: 539-543) assert, fear ‘fragmentation of aid 
delivery; the violation of corporate and national governance standards; free riding on 
debt relief; unfair company competition; scramble for extraction rights and resource 
curse outcomes for poorer countries’. 
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Table 1.3 Diverging approaches to the Paris implementation 
Paris principles DAC donors implementation Non-DAC development partners 
implementation 
Ownership National development strategy (or 
PRSP) outlines priority areas for 
donors, built up from technical 
discussion 
Ministers/senior officials articulate 
specific projects for cooperation through 
high-level political dialogue 
   
Alignment Use and strengthen recipient 
institutions and procedures, where 
feasible. Tyong of aid discouraged 
Delivery of turnkey projects in short run; 
capacity building in long term strategy. 
Tying permissible and widely used 
Harmonisation Use common arrangements to 
minimise burden on recipients. 
Multilateralisation of aid encouraged 
in all instances 
Minimise burden by avoiding 
cumbersome bureaucratic processes 
altogether. Occasional use of multilateral 
system where judged to be in interest 
   
Managing for 
results 
Use recipient-led performance 
assessment frameworks and support 
performance-based budgeting. 
Promote international best practice 
Focus on delivering aid quickly and at 
low cost. Use own development 
experiences and ‘how-to’ knowledge 
   
Mutual 
accountability 
Make aid transparent and hold each 
other accountable to Paris 
commitments via targets and 
indicators 
Ensure aid is mutually beneficial. Agree 
to fully respect each other’s sovereignty 
and eschew policy conditionality 
Source Park, 2011 
 
In the DAC-discourse the equal partnership approach is critiqued for obscuring the 
unequal power relationships between BICS and other countries (Mawdsley, 2012). 
Hypothesises include that each of the BICS is a regional (or even global) power, and 
when looking closer at the limited studies on development practices, their development 
cooperation might be a one-way street - resembling the donor-recipient relationships of 
the traditional donors. As mentioned in the Brazilian case studies, the demand 
drivenness should also be nuanced. Countries seem to provide in practice a list of pro-
jects, programmes or sectors that they could or want to support.  
 
Most attention has gone to non-interference and the absence of political conditions. 
Especially China has been accused of supporting dictatorial regimes, hampering 
the - according to DAC-donors - necessary democratic reforms. Several authors have 
urged for more nuance in this debat. They claim that there is insufficient evidence to 
assert that conditionalities of DAC-donors have caused reforms - internal and external 
factors would have been more important for these changes (for instance Woods, 2008). 
In addition, the non-DAC development cooperation is still too small in comparison with 
DAC-countries to regard it as an alternative that can completely substitute western aid 
(ECOSOC, 2008).  
 
However, these comparisons mask in itself a number of assumptions. Firstly, it gives 
the wrong impression that DAC-countries themselves have implemented the principles. 
However the evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration (see Wood et 
al., 2011) has demonstrated that this is certainly not the case. Mawdsley (2012) 
suggests that the DAC-community lacks credibility (because of the limited 
developmental results of the last decades) and legitimacy (because they speak in the 
name of the development countries). Second, the DAC-principles are implicitly con-
sidered as good aid or cooperation, while any deviation from these principles is 
regarded as bad or ineffective aid. By doing this, automatically possible effective 
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development cooperation approaches of non-DAC members are discarded. On the 
other hand, it should be noted that many of the non-DAC countries adhere to the 
principles as recipients (and thus support that donors in their own countries should 
follow these), but refrain from doing so as donors (or development partners).  
 
1.6 Instruments and modalities of Brazil, India, China and South Africa 
 
Besides providing extra funds, the BICS and other non-DAC development partners 
main potential contribution for development cooperation is often said to be the insertion 
of innovative or alternative effective solutions for development challenges (Kragelund, 
2010; Mawdsley, 2012; King, 2010). Although there are important differences between 
the BICS, their approaches are in general characterised by a focus on bilateral 
cooperation, the use of (concessional) loans and the blending of aid instruments, an 
emphasis on technical cooperation, based on their own development experiences. 
However, another hypothesis is that some of the approaches are not that different of 
those of certain DAC donors. This is illustrated with China’s technical cooperation and 
infrastructure provision to African countries for which it receives natural resources in 
return. This approach is copied from Japanese assistance to China twenty years ago 
(Mawdsley, 2012). Since the BICS have been (and still are) recipients of assistance, it 
might not come as surprise that they find inspiration (or merely reproduce) their own 
donors’ practices.  
 
1.6.1 Bilateral, multilateral increasingly trilateral cooperation 
 
Cooperation is mainly bilateral in nature, much more than that of the DAC-members - 
though multilateral cooperation should not be underestimated. Kharas et al. (2011) 
mention figures that show that multilateral aid takes up 18% the total ODA, compared 
to 30% for DAC-members. For health, Chaturvedi and Thorsteinsdóttir (2012) mention 
a figure of US$ 200 million that the BICS have contributed to global health initiatives in 
2007-2008. US$ 40 million would have gone to the GFATM. Mawdsley (2012) explains 
the preference for bilateral over multilateral cooperation by the limited trust the non-
DAC countries have in the international development institutions, due to the latters 
supposedly poor track record in achieving poverty reduction, economic growth and 
development, and because they are dominated by western donors and their ideas. A 
third explanatory factor might be that bilateral cooperation is considered a more 
effective tool to obtain the economic and political objectives in partner countries, such 
as for instance trade relationships.  
 
Despite the emphasis on bilateral relations, there is a growing number of trilateral or 
triangular cooperation initiatives. It remains a question whether the popularity of this 
form of cooperation will increase in the future. Traditionally, trilateral cooperation 
involves cooperation between a non-DAC development partner, a DAC member and a 
‘recipient’ country. The northern country provides the funds and the Southern the 
cooperation. However, there are also examples of three Southern countries working 
together. The most keen supporter of trilateral cooperation is Brazil. It has set up 
initiatives with a variety of northern donors, such as Canada, Germany, Spain, Norway, 
Japan and USAID, as well as the ILO, the FAO and the World Bank, mainly in 
Portuguese speaking African countries, Latin America and Haiti. Health and AFS have 
been featuring high on the list of topics, and more specifically vaccinations, malaria 
eradication, HIV/AIDS food security and school feeding (ECOSOC, 2008; Abdenur, 
2007). South Africa is involved in a small number of projects, but not in health or AFS, 
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while China and India have been until recently reluctant, but are exploring possibilities 
for trilateral cooperation (Langton, 2012 for India; Stahl, 2012; Pollet, 2011 for China).  
 
1.6.2 Financial instruments: credit and grants and the blending of aid 
 
The BICS make use of these same financial tools as the DAC-countries (grants, free-
interest loans, and concessional loans, as well as debt relief), but to different extents. 
For OECD-DAC donors grants are an increasingly important form of development 
cooperation, at the expense of concessional loans. Between 2003 and 2008 for 
instance, the proportion of agricultural ODA provided through grants grew from about 
half to three quarters of the total agricultural aid. Especially bilateral donors use grants, 
while multilateral ODA is characterised by concessional loans (Coppard, 2010).  
As the country case studies in the first research report show (see De Bruyn, 2013), for 
the BICS - and especially China and India, loans (also in the agricultural and the health 
sectors) are the most important financial form of development cooperation. But while 
the DAC-donors try to separate commercial and official aid flows, the Indian and 
Chinese approaches are characterised by also incorporating commercial loans in their 
development cooperation approach. Interestingly, Brautigam (2011a) shows that 
market based loans might in the current economic conditions be commercially 
comparable in interest rates and conditions to long-standing concessional loans. In 
addition, the BICS approach is characterised by the blending of different forms of 
cooperation. Konijn (2012: 1) has characterised this distinction as follows: ‘the 
approach of the traditional donors is aid-centred and mostly delinked from commercial 
flows of trade and investment, with an emphasis on social development and good 
governance. The emerging powers have a business-oriented approach in which aid is 
a minor ingredient of large integrated packages of (concessional) loans, trade and 
investment with an emphasis on natural resources extraction and infrastructure 
development’. 
 
1.6.3 Project aid in infrastructure, technical cooperation and scholarships 
 
While some of the European DAC donors promote budget and sector support, the non-
DAC countries do not. A typical feature of the BICS’ cooperation is the emphasis on 
project support. Most of the projects focus on infrastructure, equipment, technical 
cooperation and trainings and scholarships.  
 
In recent years the big infrastructure projects of China have become almost a symbol 
of the non-DAC development cooperation. In fact, these are part of the so-called 
complete projects, in which a Chinese public or private actor or consortium delivers 
infrastructure, equipment and maintenance in exchange for goods or resources. 
 
BICS and other (Southern) non-DAC countries experienced similar economic or social 
problems as their partner countries, and might therefore be well-placed to provide 
adequate solutions, adapted to a developing country context. There is still not enough 
evidence-based research available to conclude that the cooperation of the BICS 
renders their approaches more effective. In the first research report (De Bruyn, 2013) a 
variety of forms of technical cooperation were identified: (1) for half a century China 
has been sending medical teams (and more recently agricultural teams) to developing 
countries; (2) the provision of scholarships and short training courses is characteristic 
for India and China; (3) China sets up agricultural demonstration centres in different 
countries to train the local farmers and government officials cultivation techniques; 
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(4) joint research initiatives (see further); (5) diplomatic visits and study tours for 
officials as well as High Level meetings (for instance the FOCAC, the India-Africa 
Forum), are organised by Brazil, India and China. Although the prime objective of these 
meetings and visits is to foster ties and decide on cooperation, they also act as show 
cases and exchange platforms. As Cabral and Shankland (2012) point out for Brazil, 
technical cooperation is becoming more complex. Especially the South American 
country is modifying and implementing successful domestic programmes abroad, such 
as the More Food Programme and Food Purchase Programmes, the milk banks and 
Bolsa Familia.  
 
The institutional organisation of the BICS’ development cooperation reflects the 
importance of technical cooperation. As mentioned higher, the main implementers of 
technical cooperation are sector specific institutions, instead of the development 
agencies, or specific technical cooperation departments, such as ITEC in India. The 
question remains whether these technical experts do have sufficient awareness about 
cultural affinities and local context - limitations for which DAC-members have been 
criticised in the past. Furthermore, the local conditions between the BICS and their 
partner countries show differences, and hence programmes or policies which might 
have been successful in one county are therefore not exactly applicable in another (see 
for instance Li & Tang et al., 2012 for a comparison between Chinese and African 
agricultural models). Despite the potential added value of technical cooperation of the 
BICS - as is also pointed out by the BICS themselves -, in terms of share in the total 
budget of the government’s development cooperation, technical cooperation remains 
relatively low. Kharas (2012) proposes that this illustrates the high transaction costs 
related to technical cooperation.  
 
1.6.4 Global advocacy 
 
Besides the abovementioned modalities, the BICS - and especially China and Brazil 
employ global diplomacy and advocacy to bring about changes in issues which have 
an economic or social development impact for countries in the South (Marchàn, 2012; 
Schläger, 2007). This is especially apparent in health, and more specifically regarding 
intellectual property and access to medicines (Vidigal, 2012; Russo et al., 2013; GHSI, 
2012). Global diplomacy also acts as a soft power tool to enhance the political weight 
of the BICS on the international level (Russo et al., 2013).  
 
Also in international institutions, some of the BICS tend to take up important leading 
roles. In May 2013, the Brazilian Roberto Azevedo, a Brazilian, was elected to lead the 
World Trade Organisation. For the first time a Latin American will take this position. 
Another Brazilian, José Graziano da Silva is Director General of the FAO since 2012. 
One year earlier, the assembly of the WHO appointed Dr Margaret Chan of the PR 
China for a second five year term as director-general of the WHO. 
 
1.6.5 Research and development 
 
Research and development (R&D) is an increasingly important domain in which the 
BICS impact on the development challenges of the South. Research institutes are 
looking for ways to increase productivity of certain crops, and improve the effectivity of 
farming and irrigation schemes. In the past R&D activities were carried out in the BICS 
themselves, nowadays joint research initiatives with partner countries are becoming 
more frequent. PROSUL and PROAFRICA are for instance research programs of 
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Brazil that support networking building, innovation, joint research and events on 
science and technology. The programs have supported more than one hundred 
projects in agriculture, health and other sectors (Costa Vaz & Inoue, 2007). Specifically 
for cotton Brazil collaborates with institutes from different African countries to increase 
productivity. In health, Indian, Chinese, Brazilian and South African institutes and 
companies are developing affordable pharmaceutical products for tropical and 
communicable diseases (Chaturvedi & Thorsteinsdóttir, 2012).  
 
1.7 Thematic areas within health and AFS 
 
Like the DAC-donors, the BICS tend to focus on specific thematic areas within the 
different sectors. In the country case studies of the first research paper (see De Bruyn, 
2013), a number of areas were identified in health and AFS. According to some of the 
literature, these are agricultural and health challenges to which the individual countries 
have formulated a (supposedly) successful answer in their own history. It is in these 
domains that the BICS might have the biggest impact on other development actors.  
 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and other tropical and/or communicable diseases. The BICS 
can share their own solutions with other countries (Mungcal, 2012). Brazil advocates in 
the global arena the development and provision of generic medicines to combat the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic and in their bilateral relations it is supporting the building of an 
antiretroval (ARV) pharmaceutical factory in Mozambique, and promotes sensibilisation 
campaigns. Also South Africa is characterised by very high HIV/AIDS figures, but the 
country does not have an active cooperation policy in this field. Its policies act rather as 
an example on how other countries can deal with the epidemic. China supports malaria 
control initiatives and it has pledged about US$ 100 for the building of malaria treat-
ment centres and programmes (GHSI, 2012). 
 
Closely related is the very important role that the BICs, and more specifically India and 
China take in the provision of drugs. Four in five donor-funded HIV/AIDS therapies 
are provided by Indian manufacturers and between 60 and 70% of all UN-vaccines 
(GHSI, 2012). 
 
Improving the access to public health by capacity building and institutional 
strengthening is a specialty of Brazil, while reproductive health and family planning 
are foci of Chinese cooperation (GHSI, 2012).  
 
In nutrition, Brazil has emerged as an influential actor in fighting child hunger and 
domestic poverty via its programmes (Bolsa Familia and Zero Hunger) in which 
families are stimulated to send children to school and health care facilities by providing 
nutritional and cash subsidies. Another innovative programme is the Human Milk Banks 
which promotes breast feeding (Cabral & Shankland, 2013).  
 
In agriculture, China and Brazil are implementing projects and programmes to 
enhance agricultural production. The Brazilian cotton-4 and the ProSavannah 
projects are examples of Brazil, while China gears its technical cooperation towards 
sharing own experiences and agricultural models with other countries via for instance 
agricultural teams and demonstration centres. India’s green revolution on the other 
hand acts as an inspiration for other countries (Cabral & Shankland, 2012).  
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Agro-business is another feature of the BICS. Chinese and Indian state owned or 
state supported private companies are leasing land in different African countries 
(Regnier, 2013) and the governments of the BICS are promoting their companies in 
Africa in order to open up market and export possibilities.  
 
Interestingly, at the same time Brazil and China are supporting small scale 
agriculture (Li & Tang et al., 2012; Cabral & Shankland, 2012). The Brazilian More 
Food Program departs from family farming to obtain food sovereignty.  
 
The most contentious issue in agriculture are the land acquisitions of India, China 
and Brazil in Africa. These countries are investing and/or buying up land in several 
African countries. Some argue that this is to produce agriculture products and to export 
them to their own countries in order to secure their own supposed food insecurity 
problem (Von Braun & Meinzen-Dick, 2009). Others such as Brautigam and Ekman 
(2012) and Ekman (2012) concluded that the accusations are unfounded for certain 
partner countries. 
 
Lastly, India is thought to be a key player in the development and cooperation of ICT-
solutions to support the agricultural and health sectors. More broader, the country has 
becoming a forerunner in frugal innovation - although low cost solutions for 
developmental problems are said to be a characteristics of all the BICS (Bound & 
Thornton, 2012).  
 
1.8 Coordination 
 
1.8.1 Coordination and cooperation with other donors 
 
The BICS are renowned for their reluctance to coordinate with the traditional DAC 
donors, but efforts are made to change this. Multilateral institutions, such as the World 
Bank and the IMF, the OECD-DAC, and the UN do feel the emerging presence of 
some of the non-DAC donors and especially China and Brazil are gradually trying to 
reach out to these actors. They set up study groups (i.e. the China-Africa group and the 
Task Team on South-South Cooperation set up by the Working Party on Aid 
Effectiveness of the OECD-DAC), dialogue platforms (such as the Development 
Cooperation Forum), and trilateral programmes and projects. Still these initiatives have 
been criticised for being dominated by the ‘traditional’ development actors (Mawdsley, 
2012). 
 
A turning point in the distribution of diplomatic weight and power was the Busan High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011. It was the first time that DAC and non-DAC 
countries participated together as donors or providers of development cooperation to 
discuss models and ways of development cooperation (Cabral & Shankland, 2012). As 
Glennie (2012) and Kitaoka et al. (2012) assert, this did not result in agreed principles 
or standards on aid effectiveness, but it did recognise the growing importance of other 
than the DAC countries in development aid.  
 
Whether coordination and collaboration between DAC countries and the BICS will 
improve, remains still a question.  
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1.8.2 Coordination within the BICS 
 
In addition, the individual countries have made efforts to set up cooperation initiatives, 
in which continuously new acronyms of their countries’ names are introduced: such as 
BASIC, BRICS and IBSA. Although the main focus of these platforms or organisations 
is economic or political, they do have spill-overs into development cooperation. BASIC 
refers to an agreement between Brazil, South Africa and China to take a joint stance on 
climate change issues. The BRICS is a collaboration between Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa with a primarily economic and trade objective. Only the future 
can learn what the importance will be of the recently set up BRICS development bank, 
and whether it will indeed be able to compete with the World Bank and the IMF as a 
funding mechanism. IBSA is an alliance between India, Brazil and South Africa with a 
focus on governance, social and economic development. The IBSA Dialogue Forum is 
especially worth mentioning. It was established in 2003 in order to enhance economic 
and political collaboration and to increase the members’ voice and influence in the 
global arena. Sixteen working groups were established and twenty agreements signed, 
covering amongst others, the health and the agricultural sectors. In 2004, the Poverty 
and Hunger Alleviation Fund was launched. This fund focuses on knowledge and 
experience sharing, replication of innovative approaches with regards to alleviating 
poverty and hunger. The Fund is managed by the UNDP’s Special Unit for South-South 
Cooperation. Each member country provides annually US$ 1 million. The projects and 
programmes are implemented by UN agencies and their partners (Vickers, 2012).The 
Fund has made several investments in health, such as supporting the medical clinics in 
Africa, assessment of health care systems (e.g. Burundi), providing equipment for 
health care centres (e.g. in Cape Verde) (Chaturvedi, 2012).  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS: TEN WAYS IN THE BICS ARE CHALLENGING DEVELOPMENT 
COOPERATION 
 
Only in recent years, academicians and policy makers are starting to get an 
understanding of the involvement and practices of non-DAC actors in development 
cooperation. In this paper, the main characteristics and modalities of the four which 
have received the bulk of attention, Brazil, China, India and South Africa, have been 
summarised on the basis of the existing literature and policy documents. However, it is 
also obvious that a lot of questions and uncertainties still exist - especially about 
specific sectors and practices in the field. Furthermore, real facts based evidence is 
lacking about the contributions and effects of the BICS on development cooperation in 
general.  
 
Roughly, according to the literature the BICS might be challenging the ‘traditional’ 
development cooperation in ten different ways. Important to keep in mind is that the 
BICS are not a homogeneous group of countries. Besides obvious differences in 
population, history, governmental system, etc. they also differed in their experience, 
modalities and resources in development cooperation.  
 
1. The BICS, and more specifically China and India, provide an extra source of 
financial resources to the developing countries. Although the total volume is still 
rather small in comparison to the global volume of development aid (between 2 and 
3%), and little is known about the shares for AFS and health, the financial input is 
on the increase. Furthermore, on the global level it might be rather small, but for 
specific countries these financial influence of the BICS are considered to be high. 
Consequently, developing countries are presented more financial options and are 
becoming less dependent on the resources - and conditions - of the ‘traditional 
development actors’.  
2. The blending of different financial instruments such as grants, concessional 
and commercial loans and the typical use of tied aid, is markedly different from 
what the DAC-countries claim or aspire to do. There is possibility (or for some a 
fear) that these practices will be adopted by traditional donors or that some of the 
latter will give up their efforts to for instance untie their aid. 
3. The BICS regard development cooperation as an instrument of their foreign 
policy. Cooperation in health, agriculture, natural resources, infrastructure with 
other countries should not only benefit the partner countries, but also the BICS 
themselves. Win-win is a key concept in the BICS’ development cooperation and 
might become (again) a central feature in other donors’ cooperation strategies.  
4. The discourse of the BICS is said to be markedly different from that of most of the 
DAC-countries. Closer scrutiny might show that DAC as well as non-DAC countries 
emphasise in their rethoric words such as partners and partnerships, solidarity and 
equality. However, because of their history as ‘developing countries’, the BICS 
seem to be more convincing when using this kind of terminology. Nevertheless, the 
typical language of South-South cooperation might be adopted by a growing 
number of development actors and - maybe more importantly - challenges certain 
longstanding notions of development cooperation and the inherent differential 
power relations imbedded in its language.  
5. Specifically the issue of (non-)condionality has been much debated in 
development circle. For many of the DAC-donors human rights, good governance 
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and democratic structures are concepts to be reckoned with when deciding whether 
or not to engage in development cooperation. The BICS have a very different view 
on this kind of condionality, and their growing significance may modify the other 
donors’ stances on this issue.  
6. While many DAC-donors refrained from prioritising ‘hard’ sectors, and focused on 
projects and programs aimed at social issues and poverty alleviation, especially 
China and India are known to concentrate on infrastructure and focus on economic 
growth as motor of development. This approach might complement the existing 
western objectives, or might trigger a renewed interest in infrastructure and 
economic productivity in general by development actors - at the neglect of social 
sectors such as health and education. On the other hand, Brazil has been a 
forerunner in health assistance. 
7. The role of the private sector in development is an increasingly popular topic in 
the policy and academic world. The BICS - and especially India - are looked at as 
an example of how the private sector can take the lead in the economic 
development. However, the role of the private sector in the development 
cooperation approaches of the BICS is still under-researched. 
8.  The BICS may insert innovative and effective ways to address development 
challenges, based on their own experiences as a developing country. The 
underlying assumption is that the BICS show more similarities with other developing 
countries than the DAC-donor countries. Especially ICT and frugal solutions for 
development challenges are considered as very promising.  
9. Specifically in health the BICS have demonstrated valuable expertise in HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other tropical and/or communicable diseases, the provision of drugs, 
and public health by capacity building and institutional strengthening. While in 
agriculture and food security fighting child hunger and domestic poverty, 
enhance agricultural production, agro-business, small scale agriculture have been 
topics in which the BICS have carved an important place for themselves in the 
development debate.  
10. The re-appearance of the BICS (or the renewed attention for them from the DAC-
donors) has raised questions regarding the coordination of activities and opened 
up new possibilities for cooperation and partnerships, such as trilateral 
cooperation.  
 
Although the paper managed to identify a number of possible contributions and 
challenges, the overall conclusion is that there is still a lot of information missing to 
separate fact from perception and to identify whether and how the BICS are modifying 
development cooperation on the field. The way in which projects and programmes are 
developed, implemented and evaluated by the BICS is under-researched. Field and 
case studies are limited in number.  
 
The next research steps of the study for the Flemish Policy Research Centre for the 
Development Cooperation of the Flemish Government16 intend to address some of the 
knowledge gaps. Specific country studies and tangible and robust data are indeed 
limited. Consequently it is very difficult to assess whether the BICS are indeed as 
important a player in development cooperation as one would conclude from the 
multitude of published books, articles and media attention, and whether above-
mentioned challenges are indeed identifiable in practice. The next research papers will 
                                                     
16
  See www.prc-if.eu. 
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look into these issues and analyse the activities and the role of Brazil, India, China and 
South Africa in the health sector in Mozambique and the agriculture and food sector in 
Malawi. 
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